



# HARDWARE SECURITY MODULE

For automotive applications

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What we do: ***IP provider for security and video in embedded systems***

- Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium
- Global presence
- Worldwide customer base
- Founded in 1991 – 28 years experience
- Silex Insight = Silicon experts with know-how
- 45 employees






# Choose single or a complete module

We build for your specific needs



## Security enclave

eSecure ROT provides full system security



## Memory protection

Secure your flash and DDR



## Networking solutions

Accelerate your complete TLS, MACsec and IPsec traffic



## Crypto accelerators & processors

Accelerate your crypto operations



### CONFIGURABLE

Include features as needed

### SCALABLE

Define performance and footprint depending on your requirement


### CUSTOMIZABLE

Adapt to your specific needs





# Connected Car Security Threats



KIM ZETTER SECURITY 07.10.12 3:29 PM

## GONE IN 3 MINUTES: KEYLESS BMWs A BOON TO HACKER THIEVES

New vulnerability lets attackers hijack Chrysler vehicles remotely

Hackers were able to remotely control a moving Tesla Model S

Car hacking remains a very real threat as autos become ever more loaded with tech

- Securing a connected car and its sub-modules is all about trust
  - Trust Firmware running on your module?
  - Identity of modules and other connected cars?
  - Secure communication channel?
    - Privacy
    - Authenticity
    - Integrity



- What is the lifetime of your car/module?
  - Consumer electronics – few years
  - Industrial, automotive, infrastructure – up to 10s of years
- How to handle ownership changes
- Software is susceptible to bugs and must be updated over the product lifecycle
  - Firmware updates in the field required
  - How will these updates be performed securely?






A **hardware security module (HSM)** safeguards and manages digital keys for strong authentication and provides crypto processing.






# SILEX INSIGHT




- Security Enclave/Root-of-trust
- Firewall between application and secure module
- Flexible and scalable solution using any processor



- eSecure contains a flexible crypto off-loading block
- Wide range of cryptographic algorithms available
  - Asymmetric: RSA/ECC/ECDSA/Curve25519/EdDSA/SRP/J-PAKE ..
  - Symmetric: AES/SHA/ChaCha20-Poly1305/ARIA...
  - TRNG + DRBG (NIST 800-90A/B/C)
- Algorithms specific to the Chinese market also available
  - Asymmetric: SM2/SM9
  - Symmetric: SM3/SM4
- Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms also available






A **hardware security module (HSM)** safeguards and manages digital keys for strong authentication and provides crypto processing.



# HSM FOR AUTOMOTIVE

For Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC




● **Software stack available**

● **Scalable** (Tradeoff features, area, performance)


● **Configurable** (All common algorithms supported)

# Boot process






- HSM Driver
  - For non-AUTOSAR applications
  - Bare-metal support only
  
- AUTOSAR CryptoDriver
  - AUTOSAR R4.3.1 compliant
  - Wrapper around HSM driver



### Option 1 – Based on key from PUF


- Storage Root Key (SRK) generated by the PUF



- Unique per device
- Requires PUF (ordering code)
- Requires Hardware Root of Trust boot (no RMA)
- Can use only AES-GCM in CSU

### Option 2 – Based on key from eFUSEs

- Storage Root Key (SRK) generated from eFUSE seed




- Could be unique per device
- Requires seed initialization
- Requires 128 user eFUSEs (limited resource)
- Can use AES-GCM in the CSU or PL

### HSM

- Configuration of CSU tamper responses
- CSU tamper status reading and clearing
- CSU tamper trigger

#### CSU tamper sources

- CSU register
- MIO pin
- JTAG toggle
- PL SEU
- Temperature alarm
- Voltage alarm



#### CSU tamper responses

- Interrupt (custom response by host)
- System reset
- Secure lockdown
- BBRAM erase




# Anti-tampering

## HSM contains its own anti-tampering module

Since the HSM is security critical, all detected errors are considered tampers.

### HSM tamper sources


- Watchdog timeout
- RAM CRC error
- RAM unauthorized access
- Hardfault
- Software assertion
- Command authorization error
- Periodic integrity check error
- Self-test error
- TRNG health test error



### HSM tamper responses

- Level 1: interrupt
- Level 4: above and wait for reset (halt CPU)
- Level 5: above and trigger CSU tamper response

## Ensuring the secure boundary of the HSM



- Xilinx Peripheral Protection Unit to provide HSM exclusive access to
  - CSU
  - CSU DMA
  - eFUSEs

**Boot mode** ← Configure and lock XPPU → **HSM mode**

- CSU functions directly available
  - eFUSEs directly available
  - XPPU not configured
- CSU functions partly available through HSM only
  - eFUSEs available through HSM only
  - XPPU configured and locked
- Xilinx Isolation Design Flow ([XAPP1335](#)) in PL can provide extra robustness

# Frequently Asked Questions

- **What is the resource usage?**

| Device | LUT | FF  | DSP  | BRAM |
|--------|-----|-----|------|------|
| ZU11EG | 6%  | 3%  | 0,2% | 6%   |
| ZU7EV  | 8%  | 4%  | 0,4% | 11%  |
| ZU5EV  | 16% | 8%  | 0,6% | 25%  |
| ZU4EV  | 22% | 11% | 1,0% | 28%  |
| ZU3EG  | 27% | 14% | 1,9% | 17%  |
| ZU2EG  | 41% | 20% | 2,9% | 24%  |

\*All ZU+ devices are supported

- **Can I remove or add functionality to the HSM IP?**

- Yes. Generic statements allow removing or adding functionality, depending on the required features and footprint. A robust library of cryptographic IPs is available for integration.

- **What are the deliverables?**


- Netlist or RTL
- Reference design
- Firmware binary
- Driver source code
- Self-checking testbench
- Documentation

- **What is the business model?**

- Silex has a conventional IP licensing model, with license fee, royalties and annual support. NRE and design services are also available through Silex.



- Silex Insight HSM IP addresses security needs across multiple markets
  - Cryptographic offloading
  - Secure key management
  - Secure key storage
  - Flexible and scalable
  
- Smart integration to Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC enables adding security to a complex design
  
- Further investments on features and functional safety planned



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